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Abstract 
 
We use a formal value-based model to study how frictions in the product market affect value 
creation and value capture. We define frictions as incomplete linkages in the industry value 
chain that keep some parties from meeting and transacting. Frictions, which arise from search 
and switching costs, vary across markets and over time as, for example, products 
commoditize and competition becomes more global. Importantly, frictions moderate the 
intensity of industry rivalry, as well as the efficiency of the market. We find that firms with a 
competitive advantage prefer industries with lower levels of frictions than their disadvantaged 
rivals. We show that the impact of rivalry on industry attractiveness cannot be analyzed 
independently of other competitive forces such as barriers to entry and buyer bargaining 
power. We introduce resource development in our model to study the emergence and 
sustainability of competitive advantage. Firm heterogeneity emerges naturally in our model. 
We show that the extent of firm heterogeneity falls with the level of frictions, but 
sustainability increases. Overall, we show that introducing frictions makes value-based 
models of strategy even more effective at integrating analyses at the industry, firm and 
resource levels. 
 
Key words: Value-based Strategy; Biform Games; Industry Analysis; Rivalry; Barriers 
to Entry; Firm Heterogeneity; Sustainable Competitive Advantage; Formal Modeling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction
In this paper, we develop a formal analysis of the drivers of firm performance that incor-
porates critical elements of both industry, firm and resource levels of analysis. This model
is based on the formal literature that has sought to develop value-based foundations of su-
perior performance (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996, 2007; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003;
MacDonald and Ryall, 2004; Adner and Zemsky, 2006; Chatain and Zemsky, 2007).
We introduce the concept of friction in a value-based model to analyze how different
levels of rivalry affect both industry structure and firm capability development. Frictions
give rise to incomplete linkages between buyers and sellers, limiting players’ ability to find
alternatives. This reduces the high degree of rivalry that can be found when the solution
concept of the core is used without mitigating factors.1
Our goal is to make value-based strategy more consistent with traditional approaches
to industry analysis (Porter, 1980) where rivalry among firms varies at a different stage of
the industry value chain. We do so in this paper by introducing frictions into a stylized
model of market competition where the probability of a missing link in the industry supply
chain serves to parameterize the intensity of rivalry. Using this model, we can analyze
several questions of interest to strategy research. How are value creation and value capture
affected by frictions? How do other competitive forces, such as the threat of entry and
buyer bargaining power, interact with frictions and affect firm performance? Finally, how do
frictions affect the emergence and sustainability of resource-based competitive advantages?
By answering this last question we can start exploring the relationship between industry-
level competitive forces (Porter, 1980) and the emergence and sustainability of resource-based
(Rumelt, 1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991) competitive advantage.
The paper proceeds as follows: The “Background” section gives context on market fric-
tions and on the value-based approach to competitive strategy. The section titled “Frictions
and Rivaly: An Example” provides a motivating example that allows us to review value-
based analysis and to illustrate some elements of our theory. Motivated readers can skip
1The most common approach to limiting competition in prior value-based papers is to impose capacity
constraints. See Appendix 1 for an example and critique of this approach.
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that section and go directly to the section “The Model,” in which we introduce our base
model with frictions. We analyze the effect of these frictions on value creation and value
capture in the section titled “The Mapping from Value Creation to Value Capture.” The
“Barriers to Entry” section extends the base model to allow for barriers to entry. Finally,
the section titled “Endogenous Heterogeneity in Value Creation,” extends the base model
to allow for resource development and considers the emergence and sustainability of com-
petitive advantage. The paper ends with a discussion of the results and thoughts on future
work.
Background
Frictions
There is a long tradition in strategy of linking superior performance to the existence of
imperfect competition (Yao, 1988), and competitive frictions play a central role in both the
industry-level and resource-level of analysis. In particular, Mahoney (2001) argues that the
resource-based view is fundamentally about the set of frictions that enable the capture of
sustainable rents. Without any frictions, perfectly competitive product and factor markets
assure that all rents are dissipated. We build a unified model to elucidate how industry and
resource outcomes vary with the level of product market frictions.
We consider a specific, but important, class of frictions, namely frictions that gives rise
to incomplete linkages in the industry value chain. As perfect competition arises when all
buyers are always able to play all suppliers against one another, the introduction of such
frictions serves to moderate the level of rivalry in the market. Figure 1 illustrates this for
a market with two suppliers and four buyers. The left-hand panel shows a situation of
perfect competition where each supplier is linked to each buyer and hence competes for its
business. The right-hand panel shows a market with frictions in that many of the linkages
are missing. While one buyer still has access to both suppliers, the others are served by
at most one supplier.2 In addition to moderating the degree of rivalry, frictions also affect
2Another possible competitive friction is that suppliers tacitly collude in order to lessen price competition.
While this may also be important for some markets, especially ones with a stable set of competitors and
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market efficiency as buyers are not necessarily served by the supplier that creates the most
value.
V1
Suppliers
V2
Buyers
V1
Suppliers
V2
Buyers
No Frictions
(Perfect Competition)
Presence of Frictions 
(Imperfect Competition)
Figure 1: Illustration of Frictions.
What can give rise to such incomplete linkages? Three broad types of factors can be at
the root of these frictions: search costs, transaction costs, and barriers to trade.
Search costs (Baye, Morgan and Scholten, 2006) include the costs associated with discov-
ering potential trading partners. Starting from a situation in which information is lacking
(for instance, because of sheer geographical distance), a firm needs to devote resources to
gather and process information while these resources have an opportunity cost resulting in
a search that does not exhaust all possibilities.
Because of the cost of gathering information and to randomness in the process of dis-
covering new partners, potential buyers may not be able to acquire information about all
suppliers or even fail to find any. Over time, search costs can change. This can be, for exam-
observed terms of sale, it is not our focus. We focus on suppliers that compete intensely with each other
whenever they are both linked to a buyer.
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ple, thanks to new technologies that make information acquisition and transmission cheaper,
or to changes in the opportunity cost of search, as when buyers become more motivated to
find a good deal.
Transaction costs can also prevent potential ties between buyers and suppliers to be ex-
ploited. The fear of holdup may prevent investments in relationship-specific assets necessary
for value creation (Williamson, 1985). If vertical integration is not feasible, for instance
because of economies of scale in production, the combination of high transaction costs and
heterogeneity in the need for relationship-specific assets would lead some buyers to be more
connected than others.
Finally, barriers to trade can create frictions. In particular, international trade barriers
can effectively prevent foreign suppliers to compete for buyers within a national market.
Trade agreements, and effort to integrate national markets, can reduce this type of frictions.
For instance, the European Union’s single market policy has been opening national markets
to suppliers of other member states in sectors previously protected from international com-
petition. This can be seen a reduction in market frictions as the reduction in barriers to
trade expands the set of suppliers that buyers can consider.
Product characteristics can affect the level of frictions present in their market because
they are inducing more transaction costs and search costs. For example, some markets
for new innovative products could be characterized by high frictions. Buyers may need to
understand if the new product fits their needs, and suppliersmay need to understand which
buyers actually value their products. Markets for professional services (e.g., law, consulting)
could also be characterized as showing high frictions: switching costs are high and services
can be difficult to evaluate. The implication of the existence of high switching costs is
that new suppliers may not be worth be seeking out, effectively preventing the formation
of linkages. Consistent with this idea, Chatain (2010) shows empirically that competition
among law firms in the United Kingdom is largely limited to the set of suppliers with whom
a given buyer already has a relationship.3
3Although we are not focusing on frictions related to tacit collusion, there is one type of collusive practice
that does relate to the sort of friction we seek to study, namely where firms split the market and refrain
from actively competing for each others captive customers.
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As markets evolve over time, the level of frictions can change. For instance, frictions can
increase when radically new products are introduced. However, the definition of standards,
the establishment of reputations and the maturation of technologies can contribute to the
reduction of frictions. While the level of friction can go up or down, we are agnostic as to
whether the level of frictions in actual markets are rather low or high and consider the entire
range of possibilities in this paper.
We will model frictions as the result of randomness in the matching of buyers to sup-
pliers. This is close in spirit to the urn-ball models proposed in the labor search literature
(Petrongolo and Pissidares, 2001) whereby workers and firm match randomly. This mod-
elling strategy is appropriate to model frictions due to imperfection in the matching process.
Other sources of frictions leading to imperfect competition, such as increasing returns to
scale, non-convexities in production, or sunk costs (Yao, 1988) are outside of the scope of
this analysis.
We have three main research questions related to the effect of frictions. First, how do
frictions affect value creation and value capture at the firm and industry level? Second, to
what extent does the effect of rivalry (as determined by the level of frictions) depend on other
competitive forces such as the threat of entry and bargaining power? Third, how do frictions
affect the emergence and sustainability of resource-based competitive advantages? To build
a theory to address these questions, we extend recent work on a value-based approach to
strategy.
The Value-Based Approach
As originally developed by Brandenburger and Stuart (1996), the value-based approach
incorporates key elements of both industry-level and firm-level analyses. A value-based
approach starts with the set of players in the industry value chain and the “characteristic
function”, which specifies the value created by any group of industry players that work
together. Different groups create different amounts of value, which reflects the heterogeneity
in the underlying resources and capabilities of the players. The central focus in a value-
based analysis is on value capture: how total industry value creation is divided among the
various players. Following Brandenburger and Stuart (1996), the literature usually focuses
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on competitive outcomes in the “core”, an equilibrium concept specific to coalitional game
theory.4 The core is the set of divisions of total industry value creation such that no industry
subgroup can split off and make all of their members better off. The core is very appealing
as a solution concept because it requires any agreement on a division of value to be stable.
The use of concepts from coalitional game theory is consistent with the idea that players
can extensively bargain over the value they create, thus they are best suited for modelling
free-form negotiations among few players. In particular, coalitional game theory concepts
are consistent with the idea that exchange is not anonymous. In contrast, classic models of
market competition, such as Bertrand and Cournot, are assuming the existence of a price
mechanism allowing for anonymous market clearing.
The stage where value is created and captured according to a coalitional game can be
preceded by another stage where firms act to set the parameters of the subsequent coalitional
game. This preceding stage, where firms interact to create the game, can be analyzed
as a non-cooperative interaction, and solved using the concept of Nash equilibrium. The
combination of the two stages forms a biform game (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007). The
decisions made in the earlier, non-cooperative stage, are made according to how much firms
are expecting to capture in the second stage. This formalization allows researchers to neatly
distinguish between decisions firms make regarding their ability to create value – such as
entry in a market, investment in capabilities, positioning choices – and the negotiations
regarding value capture. The former stage encapsulates the jockeying among competitors
that “create the game” by giving rise to the characteristic functions, while the latter stage
takes the characteristic function as given and maps value creation to value capture.
It is commonly argued that the core embodies an extreme form of rivalry (Aumann,
1985), which can be seen as unrealistic (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). Indeed, competing
firms can capture even less value than in Bertrand price competition, which is a standard
4Coalitional game theory – also called cooperative game theory – focuses on the coalitions players form
to create value, and how the competitive interplay of the coalitions affects value capture. It does not put a
structure on the competitive interplay and allows for free-form interactions. In contrast, the more commonly
used non-cooperative strand of game theory assumes a detailed procedure for competitive interaction and
focuses on the optimal moves and countermoves implied by the procedure.
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way to model extreme rivalry.5 But it is important to keep in mind that the outcome of
a coalitional model is the result of the combination of two ingredients: the characteristic
function and the solution concept (here, the core). Our position is that the solution concept
alone is not necessarily to blame if the outcome seems unrealistic. Rather, and consistent
with MacDonald and Ryall (2004), we believe that researchers should carefully craft the
characteristic function so that the coalitions it allows to form are plausible. This, in turn,
may produce more realistic outcomes without having to rely on a different solution concept.
In this paper, we propose a simple parameterization of frictions in order to generate a set
of characteristic functions in which a player’s ability to form coalitions and create value is
restricted in a tractable way. By varying this parameter, we are able to use the same basic
model to examine how different levels of frictions in a market affect value creation and value
capture. Modeling friction in this fashion allows us to consider the effect of varying levels
of rivalry in a simple way, which is consistent with classic frameworks used in strategy, and
especially with the classic five forces framework (Porter, 1980).6
Frictions and Rivalry: An Example
Value Creation and Competition Without Frictions
We now consider a simple example that introduces key concepts from value-based strategy
including value creation, added value and the core as a solution concept. We then explain
how we incorporate frictions into the characteristic function. Motivated readers can skip
this section altogether and go directly to the section titled “The Model” where we present
5In the core, the free form negotiation between a buyer and its suppliers allows the buyer not only to
play its suppliers against each other (as in Bertrand price competition) but then to potentially negotiate an
even better deal with the most effficient supplier. See Appendix 1 for an illustrative example.
6To realize the original promise of Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) to integrate industry-level and
firm-level analyses, value-based strategy should ideally accommodate all the competitive forces traditionally
emphasized in industry analysis. Pressure from substitutes and complements are reflected in the charac-
teristic function (Brandenburger and Stuart). Building on Brandenburger and Stuart (2007), Chatain and
Zemsky (2007) introduce a parameterization of bargaining power and barriers to entry. Thus, rivalry is the
one competitive threat outside the scope of current value-based analysis.
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the base model with frictions in its entirety.
We start with the simplest case of a single supplier and buyer. A key input into a value
analysis is a specification of the value created by exchange. In this example, suppose that
the value created when the supplier serves the buyer is V1 = 10.
7 We assume that a buyer
or supplier on its own has no value creation. A player’s added value is what is lost were it
to leave the industry. In this simple example, each player is required for the exchange and
hence each player’s added value is 10. An outcome is in the core if it divides up the value
created and assures that any subgroup of players cannot do better on its own. Because the
subset of a single buyer or a single supplier does not create any value, the core allocation for
both the buyer and the supplier is anything from 0 to 10, which we write as [0, 10].
An important feature of the core is that the outcome can be indeterminate, even in simple
situations like this one. This leaves scope for bargaining power to determine how joint value
creation is split. Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) introduce a parameter α in [0, 1] that
determines which specific division players expect to negotiate within the core interval. In
this example, we take α = 1
2
: each player expects to be at the mid-point of its core allocation.
This gives an expected value capture of 5 for both the supplier and the buyer. In simple
settings such as this example, the α parameter is naturally interpreted as an industry-level
parameter of the bargaining power of buyers relative to suppliers.8
To introduce competition to the example, suppose there is a second supplier. The buyer
only needs one unit, which it can now get from either the first or second supplier. Suppose
that the second supplier is not as efficient as the first and its value creation is V2 = 8. The
efficient outcome is still for the first supplier to serve the buyer, which leads to a value
7The value created can be decomposed into the difference between the willingness-to-pay of the buyer
and the opportunity cost of the supplier; see Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) for details. Throughout this
paper, we reason directly in terms of value created.
8In general, in coalitional games, the α parameter need not reflect bargaining power. In particular,
the expected outcome may not actually lie in the core (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007). Chatain and
Zemsky (2007) provide general conditions under which the α parameter can be naturally interpreted as
reflecting bargaining power. These conditions imply the absence of capacity constraints, of externalities, and
of complementarities in added value. The examples and models in this paper satisfy these general conditions
and hence we interpret α as relative bargaining power.
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creation of 10. However, now the added value of the first supplier is only 2, since the buyer
can create 8 by going to the other supplier. As first emphasized by Brandenburger and Stuart
(1996), added value gives an upper bound on the value capture of a player. In particular, the
core now has the first supplier capturing value in the interval [0, 2] and the buyer capturing
value in the interval [8, 10]. The second supplier has no added value and hence captures
nothing. With α = 1
2
, payoffs are still at the mid-points which yields 9 for the buyer, 1 for
the first supplier and 0 for the second supplier.
As one would expect, competition has increased the value capture of the buyer, in this
case from 5 to 9. To benchmark this outcome, note that extreme rivalry is often captured
as Bertrand price competition with undifferentiated products. In the example, Bertrand
competition would lead to payoffs of 8 for the buyer and 2 for the first supplier. This
illustrates the idea that the core as a solution concept incorporates extreme rivalry (Aumann,
1985).
Introducing Frictions
A central aim of this paper is to introduce frictions into value-based analysis. We define
frictions as impediments to the free form negotiations among all players that is commonly
assumed in coalitional models. The key implication of the presence of frictions is to break
the assumption that all buyers are able to negotiate and form coalitions with all sellers. As
the most intense competition arises when all buyers are always able to play all suppliers
against one another, the introduction of frictions serves to moderate the level of rivalry.
Here, we present frictions as the outcome of randomness in the matching of buyers to
suppliers. Concretely, suppose that a buyer is unaware of a given supplier with probability
f , which parameterizes frictions for this market. We take these probabilities as independent
across suppliers. A potential buyer can be in one of four cases: connected to both suppliers,
connected to supplier 1 only, connected to supplier 2 only, or connected to none. In the
example, we set f = 1
2
. Then a buyer is equally likely to fall into each of the four cases.
It is straightforward to generalize the example to include many buyers, in which case the
expected proportion of buyers falling into each of the four possible cases would be of the
10
same size.9
How do frictions affect value creation and value capture? Without frictions value creation
is 10. Now only half the time does the buyer have access to supplier 1 and its value creation
of 10. One quarter of the time the buyer has access to just supplier 2 for a value creation or
8. In expectation, the value creation is reduced to 1
2
V1 +
1
4
V2 = 7. There are two sources of
the fall in value creation: some buyers are served by a less efficient supplier and some buyers
go unserved. Importantly, the inefficient supplier 2 can now expect to capture value equal
to: 1
4
αV2 = 1.
Does the shrinking pie and increasing role of supplier 2 negatively impact supplier 1? Not
in this example. The first supplier captures value whether or not supplier 2 is in the choice
set of the buyer, but it captures more (αV1) when it is alone than when it is in competition
(α(V1 − V2)). The first supplier’s expected value capture is then 14αV1 + 14α(V1 − V2) = 1.5,
which is more than the value capture of 1 without frictions. The reduction in rivalry more
than makes up for the fact that supplier 1 is now able to serve the buyer only with probability
1/2. In contrast, the shrinking value creation and falling rivalry among its suppliers leaves
the buyer unambiguously worse off. Its expected value capture falls from 9 to 3.5.
Now consider the incentives of suppliers to invest in resources that increase their ability
to create value. If a supplier expects to be the less efficient firm, its profits depend on
its value creation according to 1
4
αV2 =
1
8
V2. If a supplier expects to be the more efficient
firm, its profits depend on its value creation according to 1
4
αV1 +
1
4
αV1 =
1
4
V1. Hence, the
supplier that expects to be more efficient indeed has greater incentive to invest in resource
development than the less efficient one. When embedded in an equilibrium analysis (see
Section “Endogenous Heterogeneity in Value Creation”), these differential incentives give
rise to asymmetric positions in the market where expectations of market leadership are self-
reinforcing even in the case when firms start out homogeneous (i.e., V1 = V2) and with equal
access to investment opportunities.
Next, we formally specify the model and generalize the above analysis to arbitrary values
of V1, V2, α as well as different values of f depending on the supplier.
9In this example, we emphasize the probabilistic interpretation of the parameter f .
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The Model
We specify the model in two steps. We first characterize profits of one or two suppliers
competing for a given buyer. We then introduce frictions that probabilistically puts a buyer
in situations that differ in the sets of competing suppliers available.
Buyer-Suppliers Interactions
There are two competing suppliers which we label by i = 1, 2. We start by specifying
the value creation possibilities when there is a single buyer, which we denote by B. The
characteristic function v(s) gives the value creation for any set of players s. We assume:
v(B) = v(1) = v(2) = v(∅) = 0,
v(B, 1) = V1,
v(B, 2) = V2,
v(B, 1, 2) = V1.
Supplier 1 can create weakly more value than supplier 2, i.e., V1 ≥ V2.
We now characterize core allocations. The core is the set of allocations of value such that
no subset of player can appropriate more value by breaking away from the grand coalition.
Formally, write xi the value captured by player i. The core is defined by two conditions:∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),∑
i∈G
xi ≥ v(G), for all G ⊂ N .
where N is the set of all players and G is a subset of N . The first condition ensures
efficiency: the maximum possible value is created and then divided among the players. The
second condition ensures stability: each subset of players is receiving at least as much as it
can make independently of the other players.
Consider the case where both suppliers are competing for the buyer so that N = {1, 2, B}.
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It is easy to show that the set of core allocations are:
x1 + x2 + xB = V1,
x1 ∈ [0, V1 − V2],
x2 = 0,
xB ∈ [V2,V1].
The interpretation is straightforward. The total value created is V1. Supplier 2, which is
the less efficient supplier, cannot appropriate anything because it has no added value. The
buyer can play the two suppliers against each other and hence is guaranteed at least V2. The
remaining value (V1 − V2) depends on negotiations between the buyer and supplier 1.
Following Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) we map the core allocations into expected
value capture by introducing a parameter αi representing each player’s expectations regard-
ing its ability to capture value through bargaining. We set αB = α and α1 = α2 = 1 − α,
which allows us to interpret α as the bargaining power of buyers relative to suppliers.10
Expected value capture is then:
Π1 = (1− α)(V1 − V2),
Π2 = 0,
ΠB = V2 + α(V1 − V2).
The second case we examine is when a buyer is facing a single supplier so that N = {i, B}
for i ∈ {1, 2}. The core allocation is characterized by:
xi + xB = Vi,
xi ∈ [0, Vi],
xB ∈ [0, Vi].
This is a bilateral monopoly. Neither player has an effective threat it can use to guarantee
itself a minimum of value capture and the allocation of value is therefore completely inde-
terminate. With relative bargaining power still given by α, we get the following expected
10Our model satisfies the general conditions in Chatain and Zemsky (2007, assumptions A1, A2 and A3)
such that the αi parameters can be naturally interpreted as relative bargaining power of buyers over sellers.
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value capture:
Πi = (1− α)Vi,
ΠB = αVi.
For those readers familiar with the classic theories of industrial organization, it is worth
noting that Bertrand competition is a special case of this model with α = 0.
Frictions and Product Market Competition
In the manner coalitional games that model markets are typically set up, all players would be
assumed to negotiate and all possible coalitions would be allowed to form. We assume that
frictions may limit the set of available suppliers for the buyer. We model this by introducing
a probability fi (fi ∈ [0, 1])that supplier i fails to meet the buyer. Therefore fi is a measure
of the degree of frictions faced by supplier i These probabilities are independent across
suppliers.11 Another way to interpret the role of this probability is to envision an additional
player in the game (nature) which randomly determines which suppliers are available to the
buyer – and consequently which characteristic function is used to compute the payoffs.12
With two possible suppliers, there are four possible cases, which have the following ex-
pected relative sizes: The right-hand panel of Figure 1 illustrates the four cases. In the first
case, the two suppliers are both competing for the buyer. In the second and third cases,
suppliers are shielded from competition and enjoy a monopoly position. Finally, in the
fourth case, the buyer is left unserved by suppliers. Here, the assumption is that the buyer
is going with the next best alternative outside of the competitive interaction represented by
the model. This could be by (i) doing entirely without the input, (ii) producing it internally
or (iii) using a generic input (while the focal suppliers in the model are assumed to offer a
11Grossman and Shapiro (1984) use a similar partition of the market in their pioneering theory of infor-
mative advertising. In their model, the proportion of custumers that is reached by each firm is endogenous
and firms compete on price in a circular city, this allowing for horizontal differentiation. In contrast, we
take the proportions as exogenous, the products in our model are vertically differentiated, and we allow for
negotiated prices.
12The possibility of introducing uncertainty on the nature of the characteristic function is mentioned by
Brandenburger and Stuart (2007:541, footnote 14).
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Sets of Suppliers Competing for the Buyer Probability
Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 (1− f1)(1− f2)
Supplier 1 only (1− f1)f2
Supplier 2 only f1(1− f2)
None f1f2
Table 1: Size of customer segments served by suppliers
differentiated product). It can be noted that as frictions increase, the probability of head-
to-head competition falls and inefficiency due to unserved buyers and inefficient matching
increases.
Instead of a model with only one buyer, the model can be extended to include M buyers,
as long as the assumptions in Chatain and Zemsky (2007) are respected (in particular, no
capacity constraints for the suppliers, and no externalities in consumption). If there are M
buyers, then the expected number of buyers falling in each case is given by the product the
probability of each case for one buyer and M . For example, one will expect (1−f1)(1−f2)2M
buyers for which the two suppliers compete. For simplicity and without any loss of generality
we take M = 1 and will interpret the results accordingly in the rest of the paper.
Another interpretation of the buyer side would lead to similar expected value capture
and creation functions. In that interpretation, the buyer side is a continuum of arbitrary
small players, which can be split into four segments depending on the set of suppliers serving
them. The relative size of each segment is then equal to the probability that a buyer falls
into one of the four cases. Throughout the paper we however emphasize the interpretation
in terms of uncertainty in the matching of a buyer to the suppliers.
The Mapping from Value Creation to Value Capture
Value-based strategy provides an explicit mapping from the value creation possibilities of
participants in an industry value chain to their value capture. We now characterize how the
frictions in our model moderate this mapping.
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The expected total value creation is given by the following formula:
VG = (1− f1)V1 + (1− f2)f1V2
Supplier 1 creates V1 of value whenever it is in the choice set of the buyer, which occurs with
probability 1 − f1. Supplier 2 creates V2, but only when it is in the choice set and supplier
1 is not, which occurs with probability (1− f1)f2.
Using the value capture expression from Section “Buyer-Suppliers Interactions” and the
expected proportions for each case from Section “Frictions and Product Market Competi-
tion”, the expected value capture of supplier 1 is
Π1 = (1− f1)(1− f2)(1− α)(V1 − V2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value captured when
supplier 1 is in
competition with supplier 2
+ (1− f1)f2(1− α)V1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value captured when
supplier 1 is
sole supplier
= (1− f1)(1− α)(V1 − (1− f2)V2).
Active in only one case – when it is the only option available to the buyer – the expected
value capture of supplier 2 is Π2 = f1 (1− f2) (1− α)V2. The expected value capture of the
buyer is given by VG − Π1 − Π2, i.e., the total expected value created minus the expected
profits of the suppliers.
Heterogeneity in Frictions
Firms can conceivably influence unilaterally the level of frictions they face. For instance, if
frictions are due to geographically dispersed customers, suppliers can open offices or plants in
different locations to improve customer access. Advertising can increase customer awareness
of the firm’s products and firms can make efforts to develop a better reputation and foster
trust with potential customers.
Moreover, studying the impact of competitor frictions on a supplier’s value capture en-
ables isolating the effect of frictions as they change the set of competitive alternatives avail-
able to the buyer. The following proposition details the effect of frictions on profits.
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Proposition 1 With heterogenous frictions parameters:
(i) A supplier’s value capture decreases in its own friction (∂Π1
∂f1
< 0, and ∂Π2
∂f2
< 0);
(ii) A supplier’s value capture increases in its competitor’s friction (∂Π1
∂f2
> 0, and ∂Π2
∂f1
>
0);
(iii) Frictions are strategic substitutes with regard to value capture ( ∂
2Π1
∂f1∂f2
< 0, and
∂2Π2
∂f1∂f2
< 0).
Not surprisingly, a supplier’s value capture decreases in its own friction parameter. An
increase in frictions reduces the probability of meeting the buyer and reduces the expected
value creation opportunities. Conversely, when competitors face more frictions, value capture
increases because the buyer is less likely to have access to an alternative supplier, which
reduces its ability to capture value. Part (iii) of the proposition highlights that actions to
reduce frictions are strategic substitutes. To see why, consider that decreasing frictions serves
to increase the probability that a supplier establishes a link with the buyer. The expected
value captured from the buyer is lowest if the buyer also has a link with the competing
supplier. So, if the competing supplier acts to decrease its friction parameter, a supplier’s
expected returns to lowering its own friction parameter are reduced.
Common Friction Parameter
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict the attention to the case f1 = f2 = f , which is
consistent with the idea that frictions are a characteristic of the industry as a whole rather
than of any firm in particular. This also closely approximates the situation where firms have
little leeway to change their own friction parameter.
We now have expressions showing how value creation and value capture vary with fric-
tions.13 We illustrate the general results in the paper graphically using the parameter values
V1 = 10, V2 = 9, α = .3. Figure 2 plots value creation (solid line) and value capture (dashed
lines) for different values of the market level friction parameter f .
13In a slight abuse of language, and for conciseness, we write value capture and value creation while in the
probabilistic interpretation of the model these are expected value capture and value creation.
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Figure 2: Value Creation (Plain Line) and Value Capture (Dotted Lines) for V1 = 10, V2 = 9,
f1 = f2 = f , α = 0.3.
Value creation decreases in the level of friction. However, supplier value capture is non-
monotonic in the level of frictions, first increasing and then decreasing. This pattern is quite
general as shown in the following proposition.14
Proposition 2 (i) Value creation decrease monotonically with market friction f .
(ii) Value capture for supplier 2 follows an inverted U-shaped relationship and there is
an optimal level of frictions f ∗2 strictly between 0 and 1 that maximizes supplier 2’s value
capture.
(iii) For V2 > V1/2, value capture for supplier 1 follows an inverted U-shaped relationship
and there is an optimal level of frictions f ∗1 strictly between 0 and 1 that maximizes supplier
1’s value capture. For V2 ≤ V1/2,value capture for supplier 1 is monotonically decreasing in
f and f ∗1 = 0.
14The proofs of all propositions are in Appendix 2.
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(iv) Weaker suppliers prefer more frictions, i.e., f ∗1 < f
∗
2 .
In part (i), value creation falls with frictions for two reasons. First, the probability that
the buyer is unserved increases. Second, the probability that the buyer is served by the
less efficient firm increases as well. Part (ii) follows from the fact that supplier 2 can only
appropriate value when it reaches the buyer and supplier 1 does not. This happens with
probability (1−f)f , which is highest at f = 1/2. Part (iii) follows a similar logic. Supplier 1
captures the highest value from an exchange with a customer when it does not compete with
supplier 2 (with probability (1− f)f) but is also capturing value, albeit less, if it competes
with supplier 2 (with probability (1− f)2), which maximizes value capture for a lower level
of friction than that of supplier 2 (part (iv)). If the impact of competition from supplier 2
is very low (V2 ≤ V1/2), supplier 1 is better off with as little friction as possible.
The industry-level approach to superior performance emphasizes taking actions to re-
duce competitive pressures. On the other hand, firm-level approaches emphasize developing
a competitive advantage. Makadok (2009) considers the interaction between these two pre-
scriptions. Across a variety of models, he finds that their interaction is negative for a firm
with a competitive advantage. Formally, he shows that the cross-partial of rivalry reduction
and efficiency on an advantaged firm’s profits is negative. The intuition is that when rivalry
is reduced, there are less returns to investing in higher efficiency. We find a similar result in
our model, and extend his analysis to the disadvantaged firm.
Proposition 3 (i) For the advantaged supplier 1, value creation and friction have a negative
interaction effect on supplier value capture. Formally, ∂
2
∂V1∂f
Π1 < 0.
(ii) For the disadvantaged supplier 2, value creation and friction have a negative in-
teraction effect on supplier value capture only if frictions are sufficiently high. Formally,
∂2
∂V2∂f
Π2 > 0 if f <
1
2
and ∂
2
∂V2∂f
Π2 ≤ 0 if f ≥ 12 .
We find that there is no clear interaction effect for the disadvantaged firm. A firm’s
incentive to invest in value creation depends on the probability it will actually serve the buyer,
which, for the disadvantaged supplier 2, first increases with frictions and then decreases.
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Barriers to Entry
In the previous section, we saw that a simple friction parameter extended the value-based
approach to allow for varying degrees of industry rivalry. Classic industry analysis identifies
five sources of competitive pressures (“forces”), including rivalry. In our model, so far, the
classic competitive force from substitutes (and complements) is reflected in the definition
of value creation. Relative bargaining power of buyers and suppliers are reflected in the α
parameter. With the addition of friction, our value-based analysis now incorporates rivalry.
The only classic source of competitive pressure missing from the base model is the threat
of entry. This is easily rectified and we do so in this section. We follow Chatain and Zemsky
(2007) and a long tradition in industrial organization by first assuming that suppliers have
to decide whether to enter in the industry, and then parameterizing the extent of barriers
to entry by the size of the fixed costs required to serve the market. Our main focus in
extending the industry-level analysis is to examine the extent to which one can actually
analyze different competitive forces in isolation as is suggested by textbook treatments of
this subject (e.g., Grant, 2005).
The Entry Barriers Model Extension
We add an initial stage to the game where suppliers decide whether or not to enter. This gives
rise to a biform game (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007) with an initial stage using traditional
non-cooperative game theory to model competitive interactions around well defined strategic
actions, in this section entry into the market. The second stage, where those suppliers that
have entered negotiate with buyers, is the coalitional game described in the base model,
where one also needs to treat the case where only a single supplier enters.
The time line is illustrated in Figure 3. In the initial stage, suppliers decide whether to
enter. If they enter, they incur a fixed cost F . After this, the buyer and the suppliers meet
in the market, according to the friction parameter f and then negotiate and share the value
created.
We have the following value capture functions. A supplier who enters and is alone in
the market expects to the buyer with probability 1− f and has no competition. Thus, the
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Figure 3: Stages of the Game.
supplier’s value capture is:
ΠMi = (1− f)(1− α)Vi.
When both suppliers enter the market, the expected value capture is as before:
ΠD1 = (1− f) (1− α) (V1 − (1− f)V2) ,
ΠD2 = (1− f)f(1− α)V2,
where we maintain the assumption that V1 ≥ V2. Finally, a supplier that does not enter has
a value capture normalized to zero ΠNEi = 0. Note that firm profits are value capture net of
the fixed costs of entry F .
We solve the first stage for pure strategy Nash equilibria. This requires that suppliers
that enter have non-negative profits and that any supplier that stays out does not have a
positive profit from entering. For example, it is an equilibrium for only supplier 1 to enter
if and only if ΠM1 ≥ F and ΠD2 ≤ F so that supplier 1 covers its entry costs but supplier 2
would not if it were to enter.
We want to restrict the parameters such that it is possible for the market to sometimes
support both suppliers. This requires that the fixed costs are not too large, specifically
F ≤ 1
4
(1− α)V2.15
15To derive this expression, we need to assure that for some values of f both ΠD1 and Π
D
2 are at least F .
Note that maxf Π
D
2 =
1
4 (1 − α)V2 and ΠD1 ≥ ΠD2 for any f . Hence, the market can support both suppliers
for some values of f as long as F ≤ 14 (1− α)V2.
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The Interaction between Threats of Entry and Rivalry
Figure 4 illustrates the joint effect of rivalry reducing frictions and barriers to entry on the
mapping from value creation to value capture. The figure shows supplier value capture under
both monopoly and duopoly, as well as the fixed cost of entry. We will establish that there
is a non-monotonic and discontinuous effect of friction on value capture, with a complex
interaction with the height of barriers to entry. The following discussion will outline which
types of entry patterns can be supported at equilibrium. We will frequently refer to Figure
4 to illustrate the logic of the argument.
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Figure 4: Critical Values of f with V1 = 10, V2 = 9, α = 0.3, F = 1.
We first look for symmetric pure strategy equilibria, i.e., when the two suppliers have
the same strategy at equilibrium. Given the cost of entry F , we determine the values of the
friction parameter f for which entry by both suppliers is an equilibrium. Expected supplier
profits are given by subtracting the fixed cost F of entry to the value captured after entry.
Value captured after entry depends on whether the supplier is a monopolist or a duopolist,
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which is reflected in the two value capture curves shown in Figure 4. As can been seen in the
figure, supplier 2 makes positive profits upon entry while supplier 1 has also entered whenever
supplier 2’s value capture curve as a duopolist is above the horizontal line representing the
level of the cost of entry F . We see that this is the case for intermediate values of the friction
parameter f , specifically when f is above fDL and below f
D
H . It is easy to see that with these
values of f , entry by supplier 1 is also profitable as its value capture curve as a duopolist
is also above F . Moreover, one can check that either suppliers, as a monopolist, would also
make positive profits for f between fDL and f
D
H . This implies that it is a dominant strategy
for both suppliers to enter whenever f is above fDL and below f
D
H . Thus, entry by both
suppliers is an equilibrium for these values of f .
Not entering is also a dominant strategy for both suppliers when f is larger than fM ,
in rightmost part of the figure. In this area, no supplier can hope to make a positive profit
regardless of the decision made by the other supplier as value capture is less than F in any
market configuration.
We now turn to the analysis of asymmetric equilibria, where one supplier enters but the
other stays out. There are two ranges of value of f for which it is a dominant strategy
for supplier 1 to enter while entry by supplier 2 is deterred. This happens for values of f
between f̂1 and f
D
L , as well as between f
D
H and f̂2. The logic is as follows. We can see on
Figure 4 that in these two ranges of values of f , supplier 1 is making positive profits both
as a monopolist and as a duopolist. Its two value capture curves are above the horizontal
line at height F that represents the cost of entry. Supplier 1 therefore enters regardless of
supplier 2’s entry strategy. However, we see also that the fixed cost of entry (horizontal line
at level F ) is above the value captured by supplier 2 as a duopolist. Supplier 2 is thus better
off staying out because it is sure to lose money if supplier 1 enters and can be assured that
supplier will always enter.
It is a dominant strategy for supplier 2 to stay out if f is in the f̂3 to f
M interval. For
these values of f , the entry of supplier 2 cannot be profitable regardless of supplier 1’s action
as supplier 2 would not even break even as a monopolist (its value capture curve is below
F ). Given this, supplier 1’s best response is to enter, as it can make positive profits as a
monopolist in this range of values of f .
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Finally, there are two ranges of values of f for which there are two pure strategy Nash
equilibria whereby one supplier enters and the other stays out. This happens whenever the
two supplier’s monopoly value capture curves are above the fixed cost line at F while the
duopoly value capture curves are below the line. In such configuration, each firm’s best
response to entry by its competitor is to stay out, while its best response to the competitor
staying out is to enter. This happens for f between 0 and f̂1 and between f̂2 and f̂3.
The pattern for the example represented in Figure 4 holds more generally, as formalized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider the extension of the model with entry decisions. There exists three
critical friction levels 0 < fDL ≤ fDH < fM < 1 such that:
- if 0 < f < fDL , only one supplier enters;
- if fDL < f < f
D
H , both suppliers enter;
- if fDH < f < f
M , only one supplier enters;
- if fM < f no supplier enters.
As a result, there is a range of parameters for which the equilibrium is asymmetric in that
only one supplier enters, while the other stays out. This range can be divided in one part
where the unique equilibrium is supplier 1 enters, and another one where either supplier can
enter and remain a monopolist. The privileged position of supplier 1 is due to its having a
competitive advantage in the product market (V1 > V2) which widens the range of parameters
for which its entry is profitable.
Proposition 5 The region where only one supplier can enter can be split into two subsets,
one where only supplier 1 can become the monopoly supplier (for f̂1 < f < f
D
L and f
D
H < f <
f̂2) and one where either supplier could become the monopolist (for 0 < f < f̂1 and f̂2 < f <
f̂3).
Hence, even in our simple model, the effect of frictions on firm value capture becomes
quite complex when there are barriers to entry. For low levels of friction, there is a monopoly
supplier with high profits that are falling in the level of friction. At the critical value fDL
expected value capture under competition is sufficiently reduced that the market can support
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a second supplier. This leads to a discontinuous reduction in industry profit. Profits then
increase in frictions before starting to fall again. When frictions reach the critical level fDH ,
the expected market size becomes too small to support both firms, and industry profits jump
up as supplier 2 is no longer viable, leaving supplier 1 in a monopolistic position. Profits
then fall again as frictions increase. This is illustrated by Figure 5 where the thick line shows
the profits of supplier 1 (assuming it enters whenever it is possible). Our results highlight
the danger of considering in isolation the effect of different competitive forces on industry
attractiveness.
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Figure 5: Profits for Supplier 1 (thick line) under the assumption that it is always the
monopoly supplier.
Entry decisions creating discontinuities and non-monotonicities is not limited to the effect
of frictions. In our model, an increase in buyer power (α) results in a fall in all of the value
capture curves. However, this can potentially cause the value capture of the supplying
industry to increase in the bargaining power of buyers due to a shift in industry structure.
Indeed, changes in bargaining power affect the levels of the friction thresholds determining
entry. A fall in bargaining power can flip the equilibrium industry structure from a duopoly
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to a monopoly, whereby increasing industry profits. The following proposition formalizes
this point.
Proposition 6 (i) The region where both firms enter is decreasing in the relative bargaining
power of buyers. That is,
∂fDL
∂α
> 0 and
∂fDH
∂α
< 0. (ii) An increase in α when f is above but
arbitrary close to the critical threshold f = fDL leads to an increase in the total value capture
of the suppliers.
Moreover, it has to be noted that the existence of discontinuities in value capture by
suppliers also implies that there are values of f for which buyers may have an incentive to
subsidize entry in order to change the market structure to their advantage. For instance, if
f is just below fDL , a buyer would gain a lot if supplier 2 entered and increased competition
and could thus afford to subsidize supplier 2’s entry. A similar issue is analyzed in a related
model by Chatain and Zemsky (2007).
Endogenous Heterogeneity in Value Creation
The strategy literature emphasizes that firms are heterogeneous. For example, such thinking
is at the root of the resource-based view, where firms are seen as endowed with different
resource bundles. Following in this tradition, our base model takes firm heterogeneity – as
reflected in differences between V1 and V2 – as given. Of course, what are the sources of firm
heterogeneity is a fundamental question in the strategy field (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece,
1994) and this is where we turn now.
We extend our theory to consider situations where firms can invest in resources and ca-
pabilities that increase their value creation. We can then use the model to speak to two
fundamental issues in the strategy field. First, when firms are initially the same, to what
extent does heterogeneity arise endogenously when firms have equal access to resource de-
velopment opportunities? Second, when firms are initially heterogenous, to what extent
do additional resource development opportunities reinforce and sustain a leader’s compet-
itive advantage? Conversely, can a follower potentially leapfrog the leader and establish a
competitive advantage?
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The Resource Development Model Extension
We again consider a biform game. The first stage of the biform game now involves resource
development by the two suppliers. The suppliers have an initial value creation of V1 ≥ V2.
Supplier i’s final value creation is Vi + ri where ri is the extent of resource development.
There is an increasing and convex cost of resource development given by c(ri) = cr
2
i , where
c parameterizes the costliness of resource development. We do not consider entry decisions
in this extension.
The second stage of the biform game is given by the base model described in section
“The Model”, keeping the assumption f1 = f2 = f , and with two other differences. First,
supplier i’s value creation is now Vi + ri (rather than Vi). Second, profits are net of resource
development costs.16 Supplier i’s profit function depends on whether it has the higher value
creation. In particular, for i 6= j we have that
Πi =
 (1− f) (1− α) ((Vi + ri)− (1− f)(Vj + rj))− cr2i if Vi + ri ≥ Vj + rj,f(1− f)(1− α)(Vi + ri)− cri2 otherwise.
The key difference between the two parts of the profit function is that a supplier that is at
a disadvantage only captures value when it has access to the supplier and the other supplier
does not. We solve the first stage of the biform game for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in resource development levels decisions.
The Emergence and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage
The fact that the profit function is different depending on the which supplier has the highest
value creation has important implications for the emergence and sustainability of a competi-
tive advantage. The profit function implies that a supplier expecting to have an advantage in
the product market obtains higher returns from investing in the resource than a supplier that
does not expect to have an advantage. The expectation of leading in the product market,
given the competitor’s investment level, may justify a high level of investment in the resource,
which in turn entails the firm taking the leading position. Conversely, the anticipation of
16We define profits as value capture in the second stage net of costs born in the first stage. In this section
we use Πi to denote these profits, while in previous sections we used Πi to denote value capture.
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not being the leader in the product market would induce lower investment and, in turn, the
confirmation of the follower position. Depending on how these dynamics play out, an initial
advantage may or may not be sustainable. Now, we analyze in details the incentives to invest
in a resource depending on the expected relative position in terms of value creation and the
implications for the equilibrium of the resource development extension of the model.
To analyze the incentives to invest in a resource, note that if supplier i has an advantage
in value creation over supplier j (i.e., Vi + ri > Vj + rj) then supplier i’s marginal increase
in value capture in the product market thanks to resource development is (1 − α)(1 − f).
For supplier j, a marginal increase in resource development would translate into a marginal
increase of value capture of only (1−α)f(1−f). Thus, a supplier’s incentives to invest depend
fundamentally on whether it expects to have superior value creation over its competitor.
Accounting for the cost of development, we derive the optimal investment levels depending
on their relative position of a supplier in terms of value creation:
Lemma 7 In the resource development extension, a supplier’s optimal level of resource de-
velopment takes one of two values, rH > rL, where
rH =
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
=
rL
f
.
Supplier i invests in resource level rH if it expects to end up with a competitive advantage over
supplier j (i.e., Vi + ri > Vj + rj) and in resource level of r
L if it expects to be disadvantaged
(i.e., Vi + ri < Vj + rj). Moreover, the difference in optimal levels of resource development,
rH − rL, is falling in the level of frictions.
Because there are two discrete possible marginal increases of value capture due to a
marginal increase in r, there are two different optimal values: rH if the marginal increase
in value capture is high, and rL if the marginal increase in value capture is low. Figure 6
illustrates how the two possible levels of resource development vary in the level of frictions
in the market.
The existence of two discrete levels of investment has implications for the weaker sup-
plier’s ability to leapfrog the leader. Obviously, if V1 − V2 is larger than rH − rL =
(1−α)(1− f)2/2c, there is no possibility for supplier 2 to become the new leader. However,
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α = 0.3, c = 0.1.
the full analysis of the equilibrium conditions shows that the range of values of V1 − V2
allowing for a change in industry leadership is even narrower than rH − rL:17
Proposition 8 Consider the resource development extension with V1 < V2.
- If
V1 − V2 < (1− α) (1− f)
2
4c
, (1)
then there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria:
(i) A “sustaining” equilibrium where r∗1 = r
H and r∗2 = r
L so that the initial market
leader increases its competitive advantage.
17If V1 − V2 < rH − rL = (1 − α)(1 − f)2/2c, supplier 2 could conceivably invest at level rH and be
the leader if supplier 1 invests at level rL. However, this cannot be part of a pure strategy equilibrium if
V1−V2 > (1−α)(1−f)
2
4c . In that case, when supplier 1 invests at level r
L, supplier 2 is still better off investing
at rL rather than rH . The reason is that the additional expected value capture per customer is not covering
the resource development costs. But then, if supplier 2 invests at level rL, supplier 1’s best response is to
step up and invest rH .
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(ii) A “leapfrogging” equilibrium where r∗1 = r
L and r∗2 = r
H so that the initially weaker
firm becomes the market leader.
- If V1 − V2 > (1−α)(1−f)
2
4c
, the “sustaining” equilibrium is the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
If inequality 1 holds, we have another case of multiple equilibria. From a game-theoretical
point of view, nothing in the game itself can help us decide which of the sustaining and the
leapfrogging equilibria is most likely to emerge. One of the most influential approaches to
this problem was offered by Thomas Schelling. Schelling (1960) argued that a particular
equilibrium is more likely to be played if it is “focal”, i.e., if social and cultural factors make
players expect it to be played and ensure consistent expectations.18 The context and the
expectations leading to such selection based on focal points is not captured in our formalism.
However, one can speculate that managing expectations about market leadership can make
an advantageous equilibrium focal and hence it can be a driver of superior performance.
Put differently, if the strategic interactions among suppliers exhibit multiple equilibria, then
firms clearly have incentives to manipulate expectations.
This result also has implication for the emergence of competitive heterogeneity. It is easy
to extend proposition 8 to a situation where suppliers are initially identical and see that
resource development can endogenously create heterogeneity.
Corollary 9 Consider the resource development extension where the two firms are initially
homogeneous (i.e. V1 = V2). All pure strategy Nash equilibria are asymmetric and imply that
one supplier ends up with a competitive advantage and develops resources at level rH while
the other develops resources at level rL.
An important question in strategy is the extent to which an advantage is sustainable.
Examining proposition 8, we see that it is always an equilibrium for an initial competitive
18Focal points are particularly important in coordination games. A famous example of a focal point in a
game where players need to independently coordinate to meet in New York City, is the Grand Central train
station.
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advantage to be sustained.19 However, when inequality 1 holds, the leader’s initial competi-
tive advantage is vulnerable if the follower can create expectations that it is the one to more
aggressively exploit the opportunity to invest in the new resource. Figure 7 illustrates how
the leader’s competitive advantage is more likely to be secure when: the initial heterogene-
ity V1− V2 is greater, friction in the market f is greater, and the cost c of developing new
resources is higher.
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Figure 7: Domain of sustainability for c, f and different levels of V1 − V2.
Our analysis of sustainability illustrates the importance of accounting for elements com-
monly thought of at separate levels in strategy analysis. Our condition on sustainability
depends at the industry level on the extent of competitive frictions f , at the firm level on
the level of initial advantage V1 − V2, and at the resource level on the ease of developing
resources c.
19While much work in strategy operationalizes sustainability in terms of the interval of time over which
an advantage is sustained, our emphasis is different. We focus on a definition of sustainability based on
strategic incentives, specifically whether a follower can have an incentive to outinvest the leader given the
leader’s optimal reaction.
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Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we started with a model of value creation and value capture in a product
market based on a coalitional game. We added a simple friction parameter to reflect that
incomplete linkages between buyers and suppliers can give rise to imperfect competition.
This allowed us to parameterize in a simple manner the intensity of competition in the
standard value-based framework while keeping the benefits that this framework brings for
strategy theorizing. Given the importance of frictions in strategy scholarship, we see this as
a useful extension of value-based analysis.
The model we presented in this paper has some limitations. Key to the model is the
contrast between two types of buyers: those served by one supplier, allowing high value
capture by the supplier, and those served by two suppliers, allowing lower value capture. If
more suppliers are added and the friction parameter is kept constant, the probability that a
buyer is served by only one supplier will decrease and so will the expected value capture by
suppliers. The insights from our model with two suppliers and a given level of friction could
however still be transposed to a model with more suppliers and a higher level of friction.
Indeed, keeping the number of suppliers constant, the probability that a buyer is served by
only one supplier, conditional on being served at all, is increasing in the friction parameter.
A different line of argumentation is that the assumption of a small number of suppliers
can be realistic if entry into the industry is limited to a few firms. This could be, for instance,
because of economies of scale in production or because the factors needed for competing in
the product market (e.g., the intellectual property) are intrinsically scarce.
Relationship to Economic Literature on Search and Buyer-Supplier
Networks
The overall focus of this paper is quite different from that of models of search developed and
used in economics. We explored how frictions affect business strategy decisions, such as entry
and investment in capabilities, while research in economics focusing on search models has
been concerned with explaining the mechanism explaining the widely observed dispersion
of prices (including wage differentials) for similar goods in the economy (Baye, Morgan and
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Scholten, 2006) or with the shape of aggregate functions matching workers to firms in the
economy (Petrongolo and Pissidares, 2001).
In particular, models of sequential and simultaneous searches seek to understand the
optimal strategies of buyers (e.g., when to stop searching) and suppliers (e.g., what price to
post). We abstracted away from these questions by directly assuming a random matching
process that produces inefficiencies, while the inefficiencies in matching are the outcome of
interest of the full-fledged search models. However, in keeping with that literature, we did
find that less efficient suppliers prefer an environment with more frictions as frictions protects
them from competition. However, in our model, prices become implicitly more dispersed as
frictions increase, while the search cost literature is inconclusive in that regard. It is indeed
possible to build models where lower search costs create more price dispersion (Baye, Morgan
and Scholten, 2006).
Our model also relates to models of buyer-supplier networks. The matching technology
essentially produces a particular case of a random bipartite graph. For instance research by
Corominas-Bosch (2004) explores the implications of the configuration of general bipartite
networks on value capture and reaches conclusions consistent with those of our coalitional
game stage.
Implications for Value-Based Strategy Research
Value-based models are not always easy use, if only because the core solution concepts can
give, in some cases, seemingly unrealistic results. This has led some scholars to criticize
the use of the core (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) while still recognizing the merits of the
coalitional formalism. In this paper we take a different position: we concur that the use
of the core can lead to unrealistic results, but we locate the problem mainly in how the
characteristic function is set up, not necessarily in the solution concept itself.
In order to address this issue, we implemented a simple way to model frictions in a market,
which allows parameterizing the availability of outside opportunities to players, and, as a
result, the intensity of competition in the game. We believe that this contributes to make
the value-based models even more relevant to business strategy research. Their strength is
that they require a modeler to be explicit about all the value creation possibilities. This is
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not always an easy task as two opposite concerns need to be balanced. On the one hand,
a very simple and generic characteristic function may lead to results that seem too strong,
as in the famous example of the “glove market,” in which oversupply by one single unit
on either side of the market has dramatic consequences on value capture20. On the other
hand, a realistic characteristic function allowing for heterogenous agents and complex value
creation possibilities may be intractable. Using the device of the friction parameter f , the
model presented in this paper sought to strike a balance between generality and tractability.
This approach can be used in other models to leverage the strength of coalitional games
while keeping them tractable and convenient to analyze, yet realistic.
The flexible nature of the value-based modeling approach also permitted to analyze the
interaction of different levels of analysis in a single model, which is typically difficult with-
out resorting to formal modeling (Adner, Polos, Ryall and Sorenson, 2009) and is further
indicative of its potential for the study of competitive strategy questions (Ghemawat and
Cassiman, 2007).
Implications for Competitive Strategy Theory
The analyses in this paper also speak to a few important issues in competitive strategy. Our
model brings together, in a unified way, elements that are traditionally thought of as per-
taining to different levels of analysis. In our model, we incorporate structural determinants
of the industry’s profitability (barriers to entry, frictions affecting the intensity of competi-
tion, buyer and supplier power) advanced by Porter (1980). At the same time, our model
explicitly allows for firm-level heterogeneity in investment in resources and value creation,
which are themes typically developed by theorists of the resource-based tradition (Rumelt,
1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991).
Our analyses reveal that, far from being separable, industry-level and firm-level factors
can be in fact deeply intertwined. First, the mapping between firm value creation and value
capture is moderated by industry-level factors. For instance, we find that the extent of
frictions in the product market is always negatively related to value creation, but has a
20See Appendix 1 for details.
34
U-shaped relationship with value capture.
Second, firm heterogeneity depends on parameters of the resource development process,
but also on parameters of the industry. In our model, endogenous differences in value creation
appear as the outcome of strategic interactions. Because of frictions, which can prevent a
buyer from negotiating with both suppliers at the same time, there is a niche available in the
market for a weaker supplier, which justifies this supplier’s investment in the development
of capabilities.
Third, our model explores how the height of barriers to entry interacts with the presence
of frictions and the cost of resource development to shape industry structure. What may
seem as two independent factors – barriers to entry, and frictions – affecting the industry
can in fact have complex and consequential interactions. For a given level of entry cost,
increasing frictions in the product market can either increase or decrease the number of
active suppliers depending on which critical threshold is crossed.
This finding relates to an important stream of empirical work (Rumelt, 1991; McGahan
and Porter, 1997) that has sought to quantify the relative influence of industry, corporate
and business unit effects on firm performance. Studies in that stream have found that both
industry- and firm-levels effects matter but also suggest the existence of complex interactions
between the different levels (McGahan and Porter, 2003). Our analysis identifies some the
mechanisms potentially underlying these cross-level interactions.
In addition to shedding light on possible sources of firm heterogeneity, our model also
speaks to the conditions under which heterogeneity may persist. In our model, a firm starting
with a handicap in terms of value creation can take the opportunity of resource development
to catch up and leapfrog a leader. Hence, firm positions are not necessarily determinate.
Moreover, our model also gives boundary conditions for the fluidity of firms’ relative posi-
tions. If the initial value creation difference between firms is above a certain threshold, the
current relative positions cannot change. This threshold depends on characteristics of the
industry such as the relative bargaining power of buyers versus suppliers and the level of
frictions. While a lot of the strategy literature on sustainability of competitive advantage
has looked into resource characteristics (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) to explain the sustain-
ability of advantage, we complement that approach by suggesting that strategic (i.e., game
35
theoretical) considerations may compel firms to choose different levels of investment in re-
sources. Finally, our model speaks to the link between value creation in the product market
and the value of strategic resources, an area that has been identified as relatively lacking in
the resource based view of the firm (Priem and Butler, 2001). In our model, resources are
developed in relationship to the value they can create to customers in the product market
relative to competition, and firm heterogeneity is ultimately the outcome of interactions in
the product market.
Implications for Empirical Research
Experiments (Charness, Corominas-Bosch and Fre´chette, 2007) have shown that negotia-
tions between agents that are connected by incomplete linkages yield outcomes very close to
those predicted by our baseline model of value creation and capture. Moreover it has been
shown that the pattern of incomplete linkages can matter to the mapping of firm capabili-
ties into firm performance when buyer-supplier relationships are costly to create (Chatain,
2010). This suggests that explicitly modelling and measuring frictions as incomplete linkages
can sharpen empirical studies of performance heterogeneity. Implicitly assuming complete
linkages when they are in reality incomplete would lead to biased estimates of the impact of
capabilities on performance.
Future empirical work related to frictions can follow at least two other paths. First, this
paper suggests that incentives to invest in new capabilities depend crucially on the extent
of frictions (i.e., the extent to which linkages are incomplete) that each firm is facing. A
potential empirical research design would start with an exogenous shock to frictions (i.e.,
a regulatory change) and explore the implications for firm investment policies. Levels of
investment should change depending on frictions and relative capabilities. Second, the results
of this model suggest that changes of leadership are more likely in industries with more
frictions. Another empirical research design would compare industries with different levels
of frictions and seek to measure how relative firm position are more or less stable.
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Conclusion
The usefulness of a formal analysis like the one we presented stems from its ability to un-
cover drivers of the emergence and sustainability of firm heterogeneity and to identify the
sometimes complex mechanisms that creates incentives for firms to occupy different posi-
tions in the market. This model is admittedly highly stylized and future work can extend
this analysis in a variety of ways. We would particularly highlight the need to add hori-
zontal differentiation and allowing the set of linkages in the industry to be at least partially
endogenous.
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Appendix 1: Capacity Constraints and Value Capture
In this appendix we take a look at how capacity constraints matter for value capture in coali-
tional games through two examples. The first example is the classic glove market example,
39
and highlights how the assumption that all coalitions can equally form, irrespective of the
number of agents, can lead to extreme results in terms of value appropriation. In the second
example we look at suppliers of product of different quality facing a fixed demand and vary
their production capacity to see how different assumptions affect the core allocation and
their added value.
The Glove Market (Matching Market for Complementary Goods)
Consider a market with two sides: owners of one right glove and owners of one left glove.
A unit of value is created only when one right and one left glove are put together. Suppose
there are 1001 owners of one left glove each and 1000 owners of one right glove each. A total
value of 1000 can be created. The core allocation is such that each owner of a left glove
appropriates 1 and each owner of a right glove appropriates zero. The result is driven by
the fact that one side of the market is longer by one unit (i.e., there is an excess supply of
one right glove), which is enough to prevent players on the longer side to appropriate any
value because none of them has a strictly positive added value. The glove market result is an
example of how the core can embody “extreme cut throat competition” (Aumann, 1985). It
can be noted that the extreme result given by the core is driven by the implicit assumption
that all possible coalitions can form, even if this assumption may not be reasonable with
that number of players. The structure of the characteristic function, which in this case does
not include any friction, is thus also a contributing factor to the counterintuitive result.
Production Capacity and Value Capture
One way to allow a weaker supplier to capture value is to introduce capacity constraints.
We now explore in an example the joint effect of differences in value creation and capacity
constraints on value capture. In this scenario, we have two suppliers with value creation per
unit respectively equal to V1 = 10 and V2 = 8. There are three buyers, each in need of at
most one unit. In table 2, we look at different scenarios for the capacity (i.e., the number
of units each supplier can produce) of the suppliers, holding everything else (value creation
per unit and number of buyers) constant. For each supplier, we present the lower and upper
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bounds of the core as well as the added value. For instance, the first column considers the
case where each supplier can produce one unit. The upper and lower bounds of the core for
supplier 1 coincide and are equal to 10.
Capacity Supplier 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3
Supplier 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
Core bounds [Lower,Upper] Supplier 1 [10,10] [4,20] [6,10] [4,4] [0,6] [4,4] [0,6]
Supplier 2 [8,8] [0,8] [8,16] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
Added Value Supplier 1 10 20 10 12 14 6 6
Supplier 2 8 8 16 8 0 4 0
Table 2: Value Capture by Suppliers Depending on Capacity Constraints
In this simple setting, we see that capacity constraints at the industry level lead to high
value capture. As long as the sum of the capacities of supplier one and two is less or equal
to 3, they can both potentially capture a lot of value. Once there is extra capacity on the
market, supplier 2 cannot hope to capture anything, even when it may have strictly positive
added value. Although supplier 1 fares better than supplier 2, it would be in some cases
better off if it reduced its production capacity. Consider the last two columns of the table.
In both columns, supplier 2 has a capacity of 3 units. If supplier 1 has a capacity of 2 units,
it is assured to capture 4 (see second to last column). If supplier 2 has a capacity of three,
its value capture will be in the interval [0,6]. Depending on the bargaining power of the
buyers, supplier 1 can hope to capture less or more than 4.
This example suggests that, absent frictions, there are two paths to value capture for a
supplier. The first involves the ability to create superior value compared to competitors. The
second involves the ownership of production capacity that are scarce enough in comparison
to the demand. The less efficient producer (supplier 2) can only appropriate value when
there is demand that is not satisfied by the more efficient firm. This is reminiscent of the
mechanism leading to Ricardian rents, with the difference that here the distribution of value
is determined by multilateral negotiations involving all possible coalitions, rather than by a
unique market price.
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Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Omitted. The expressions are easily derived from the value capture expression in the intro-
duction of the “Mapping from Value Creation to Value Capture” section.
Proof of Proposition 2
Value creation is given by VG = (1 − f)V1 + f(1 − f)V2.We have dVGdf = V2 − V1 − 2fV2 ,
which is negative or equal to zero since V1 ≥ V2 and 0 ≤ f ≤ 1. Hence VG is monotonically
decreasing as f increases within the interval (0, 1).
The influence of the friction parameter f on value capture is given by the derivative of
the profit function.
Π1 = (1− f) (1− α) (V1 − (1− f)V2) ,
Π2 = f(1− f)(1− α)V2.
From these, we get:
∂Π1
∂f
= (1− α)(2V2(1− f)− V1),
∂Π2
∂f
= (1− α) (1− 2f)V2.
Since 1 − α > 0, we have ∂Π1
∂f
≥ 0 if and only if f < 1 − V1
2V2
. Define f ∗1 = 1 − V12V2 , the
value of f for which Π1 is maximal.
Note that f ∗1 > 0 if and only if V1 < 2V2. Moreover, because V1 ≥ V2, we also have
f ∗1 ≤ 12 . Similarly, we have ∂Π2∂f ≥ 0 if and only f ≤ 12 . Define f ∗2 = 12 , the value of f for
which Π2 is maximal. We then have f
∗
1 < f
∗
2 .
Proof of Proposition 3
From the profit function Π1 and Π2 we get
∂2
∂V1∂f
Π1 = α− 1 < 0 and ∂2∂V2∂fΠ2 = 1− 2f . We
have ∂
2
∂V2∂f
Π2 > 0 if and only if f <
1
2
.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Equilibrium with Duopoly
First, let us find out the parameters f that allow two suppliers to enter and be profitable.
For this, we need that the weaker supplier has weakly positive profits, conditional on the
presence of a stronger supplier in the market. The thresholds for the entry of a second
supplier are therefore defined the equation f(1− f)(1− α)V2 − F = 0. There are two roots
to this equation:
fDL =
1
2V2 (1− α)
(
(1− α)V2 −
√
V2 (1− α) ((1− α)V2 − 4F )
)
,
fDH =
1
2V2 (1− α)
(
(1− α)V2 +
√
V2 (1− α) ((1− α)V2 − 4F )
)
.
which define the upper and the lower bound of the parameter f that support entry by
both firm. Notice that ΠD1 > Π
D
2 , so it is also optimal for supplier 1 to enter. In summary,
in fDL > f > f
D
H , both firms are profitable from entry.
Equilibrium with no entry
An equilibrium with no entry can obtain when neither supplier can be profitable upon
entry even in the most favorable case where they are alone in the market. We know that
supplier 1’s monopoly profits are superior to supplier 2’s monopoly profit. The boundary of
the no entry area is defined by ΠM1 − F = 0, i.e., for (1 − α)V1 − F = 0. The threshold at
which the first supplier is indifferent between entering and not entering is therefore defined
by fM = 1− F/ ((1− α)V1). As profits go to zero as f reached 1, the region where neither
suppliers enter is the interval (fM , 1].
Equilibria with entry by a single supplier
For entry by a single supplier to be an equilibrium it has to be that the supplier that
enters is profitable, while the supplier that enters would have negative profits upon entry
and hence prefers to stay out.
Multiple equilibria with entry of only one of the two suppliers are possible only when
supplier 1’s profits under competition are negative, while the profits under monopoly of
supplier 2 are positive.
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The condition for zero profits of supplier 1 ((1− f) (1− α) (V1 − (1− f)V2) − F = 0)
defines two thresholds f̂1 and f̂2 such that:
f̂1 =
1
2(1− α)V2
(
(1− α)(2V2 − V1)−
√
(1− α) ((1− α)V 21 − 4FV2)
)
,
f̂2 =
1
2(1− α)V2
(
(1− α)(2V2 − V1) +
√
(1− α) ((1− α)V 21 − 4FV2)
)
.
Moreover, there is a threshold f̂3 is defined by supplier 2 making exactly zero profit when
it is alone in the market, which means f̂3 = 1− F/ ((1− α)V2).
Taking all these thresholds together we can characterize the different equilibria in function
of the value of f .
For very low levels of frictions (0 < f ≤ f̂1), there are two possible equilibria: either
supplier 1 or supplier 2 enters and the other supplier stays out. The reason is that neither
supplier can make a profit if the other is in the market, but both can make a profit if they
are alone in the market.
If f̂1 < f ≤ fDL , supplier 1 always enter and supplier 2 stays out. Supplier 1 will be
profitable regardless of whether supplier 2 has entered while supplier 2 cannot make a profit
if supplier 1 has entered. Thus to enter is a dominant strategy for supplier 1.
If fDL < f < f
H
L , both suppliers enter, as they are always making strictly positive profits
regardless of the other supplier’s decision.
If fHL ≤ f < f̂2, supplier 1 enters alone. Supplier 1 is always making while if supplier 2
entered it would suffer a loss.
If f̂2 ≤ f < f̂3, then there is another region of multiple equilibria, as either supplier can
enter and if it does so it makes the other supplier unprofitable.
If f̂3 ≤ f < fM , only supplier 1 can enter and make a profit while being alone, leading
to a unique equilibrium.
Finally, if fM ≤ f , then there is no entry at all.
It is easy to show that f̂1 < f
D
L < f
H
L < f̂2 < f̂3 < fM .
Moreover, note that f̂1 > 0 if and only if:
(1− α)(2V2 − V1) >
√
(1− α) ((1− α)V 21 − 4FV2).
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This is impossible if 2V2 ≤ V1. If 2V2 > V1, it is easy to show that we need F ≥ V1 − V2 to
ensure f̂1 ≥ 0. Note thatf̂1 < 0 simply means that there is no multiplicity in the concerned
region.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Take the threshold fDL and f
D
H and differentiate them according to α.
We have
∂fDL
∂α
= F
(1−α)
√
V2(α−1)(4F−V2+αV2)
> 0 and
∂fDH
∂α
= − F
(1−α)
√
V2(α−1)(4F−V2+αV2)
< 0.
(ii) Denote fDL (α) the lower threshold for the entry of a second supplier given buyer
bargaining power α. Take a value of the friction parameter fT and an arbitrary small ε > 0
such that fDL (α) < f
T < fDL (α+ ε). From (i) we know that f
D
L (α) is strictly increasing in α
for α > 0. Holding frictions constant, an increase ε of the buyer bargaining power leads to
a change in entry equilibrium from entry by both suppliers 1 and 2 (fDL (α) < f
T ) to entry
by supplier 1 alone (fT < fDL (α + ε)). Industry profits with only supplier 1 are equal to
(1− fT )(1− α− ε)V1 − F .
Industry profits for the two-supplier entry equilibrium are equal to:(
1− fT ) (1− α) (V1 − (1− fT )V2)+ (1− fT ) fT (1− α)V2 − 2F.
Hence, the difference in industry profits between after the increase of ε of the buyer bargaining
power and before is:
(1− f)(1− α)(1− 2f)V2 − ε(1− f)V1 + F .
Note that by definition fDL ≤ 12 since the highest profit of supplier 2 is at f = 12 , hence
fT ≤ 1
2
. Given this, V1 ≥ V2, and ε > 0, the above expression is strictly positive for an
arbitrary small ε. Therefore, there are values of f strictly above fDL (α) for which an increase
in buyer bargaining power can lead to an increase in total supplier profits.
Proof of Lemma 7
Suppliers will invest in developing a resource until the marginal value capture from the
resource equalizes the marginal cost of building the resource. In this model marginal value
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capture can only take two values, depending on whether the supplier expects to be the higher
value creating firm or the lower value creating firm. If a supplier expects that its overall value
creation (Vi + ri) will be lower than that of its competitor (Vi + ri < Vj + rj) it will invest
in a low level of extra value creation ability. This is because this investment will provide
extra value capture only for a fraction of the buyer base equal to f(1 − f). In contrast, a
supplier expecting to be ahead (i.e., Vi + ri > Vj + rj) will be able to increase its marginal
value capture on a fraction (1 − f) of the buyer base. As the marginal increase of value
capture can only take two values, the optimal investment can only be at two levels: high
(rH = (1−f)(1−α)
2c
) or low (rL = f(1−f)(1−α)
2c
).
The difference between the two levels of resource development is rH − rL = 1
2c
(1 −
α) (1− f)2, which is decreasing in f for values of f in [0, 1].
Proof of Propositions 8 and 9
Without loss of generality, assume V1 > V2. We know from lemma 7 that a supplier’s
investment can only take two values rH = (1−f)(1−α)
2c
, or rL = f(1−f)(1−α)
2c
. Let us first show
that symmetric equilibria cannot exist.
Nonexistence of pure strategy symmetric equilibria
Denote (r1,r2) a candidate equilibrium. Assume symmetric strategies (r1 = r2). Note
that V1 + r1 ≥ V2 + r2, since V1 > V2.Supplier 1 will always create more value.
If V1 + r1 ≥ V2 + r2, we have the following profit functions:
Π1(r1, r2) = (1− f) (1− α) ((V1 + r1)− (1− f)(V2 + r2))− c (r1)2 ,
Π2(r1, r2) = f(1− f)(1− α)(V2 + r2)− c(r2)2.
Suppose (rH , rH) is an equilibrium, then we will show that supplier 2 always wants to
deviate, resulting in a contradiction.
With strategy profile (rH , rH), supplier 1 has higher value creation. In this situation,
supplier 2’s profits are:
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Π2(r
H , rH) = f(1− f)(1− α)(V2 + rH)− c(rH)2
= f(1− f)(1− α)
(
V2 +
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− c
(
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
However, supplier 2’s profits upon deviation to rL are:
Π2(r
H , rL) = f(1− f)(1− α)(V2 + rL)− c(rL)2
= f(1− f)(1− α)
(
V2 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− c
(
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
But: Π2(r
H , rL)−Π2(rH , rH) = 14c (1− α)2 (1− f)4 > 0. So supplier 2 will always deviate
to rL and (rH , rH) cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose (rL, rL) is an equilibrium, then we will show that supplier 1 always wants to
deviate, resulting in a contradiction.
Supplier 1’s profit at strategy (rL, rL) are:
Π1(r
L, rL) = (1− f) (1− α) ((V1 + rL)− (1− f)(V2 + rL))− c (rL)2
= (1− f) (1− α)
((
V1 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− (1− f)
(
V2 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
))
− c
(
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
However, supplier 1’s profits upon deviation to rH are:
Π1(r
H , rL) = (1− f) (1− α) ((V1 + rH)− (1− f)(V2 + rL))− c (rH)2
= (1− f) (1− α)
((
V1 +
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− (1− f)
(
V2 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
))
− c
(
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
But, Π1(r
H , rL)−Π1(rL, rL) = 14c (1− α)2 (1− f)4 > 0. So supplier 1 will always deviate
and (rL, rL) cannot be an equilibrium.
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In conclusion, neither (rH , rH) nor (rL, rL) can be equilibria, thus there are no pure
strategy symmetric equilibria.
Existence of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
We first show that, for any V1 > V2 , (r
H , rL) is always an equilibrium. Since rH > rL, we
still have V1 +r
H > V2 +r
L. Given this, each firm has no incentive to deviate by definition of
the investment levels rH and rL since any deviation would not change which firm is creating
more value.
We now derive the conditions under which, if V1 > V2 , (r
L, rH) is an equilibrium. It is
an equilibrium if an only if conditions (a) (feasibility) and (b) and (c) (equilibrium of best
responses) are fulfilled.
(a) The positions can switch and supplier 2 can come on top by investing at the high
level, given r2 = r
H
This is possible if and only if:
V1 + r
L < V2 + r
H
V1 − V2 < 1
2c
(1− α) (1− f)2 .
(b) Supplier 2 doesn’t want to deviate given supplier 1’s investment.
Here, supplier 2’s deviation is to fall back on rL. Without deviation, we have V1 + r
L <
V2 + r
H and
Π2(r
L, rH) = (1− f) (1− α) ((V2 + rH)− (1− f)(V1 + rL))− c (rH)2
= (1− f) (1− α)
((
V2 +
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− (1− f)
(
V1 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
))
− c
(
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
The deviation to rL would put supplier 2 behind supplier 1 in terms of value creation.
Hence profits would be:
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Π2(r
L, rL) = f(1− f)(1− α)(V2 + rL)− c(rL)2
= f(1− f)(1− α)
(
V2 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− c
(
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
Π2(r
L, rH)− Π2(rL, rL) = 1
4c
(1− α) (f − 1)2 ((f − 1)2 (1− α)− 4cV1 + 4cV2).
Deviating is not profitable if and only if Π2(r
L, rH)− Π2(rL, rL) > 0, i.e.:
(f − 1)2 (1− α)− 4cV1 + 4cV2 > 0
V1 − V2 < 1
4c
(1− α) (f − 1)2 .
(c) Supplier 1 doesn’t want to deviate given supplier 2’s investment. That is:
Π1(r
L, rH) = f(1− f)(1− α)(V1 + rL)− c(rL)2
= f(1− f)(1− α)
(
V1 +
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− c
(
f(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
The deviation would be to increase development to rH . Deviating would give:
Π1(r
H , rH) = (1− f) (1− α) ((V1 + rH)− (1− f)(V2 + rH))− c (rH)2
= (1− f) (1− α)
((
V1 +
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)
− (1− f)
(
V2 +
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
))
− c
(
(1− f)(1− α)
2c
)2
.
Deviating is not profitable if and only if Π1(r
L, rH)− Π1(rH , rH) > 0, i.e.:
V1 − V2 < 1
4c
(1− α) (1− f)2 .
Which is the same condition as in (b), but is more stringent than condition (a). In
summary, the “leapfrogging” equilibrium exists if and only if V1 − V2 < 14c (1− α) (1− f)2.
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